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Abstract 
 
This paper examines the political processes surrounding the development and 
demise of an ambitious, yet short-lived, policy-based learning initiative, a 
university for the UK National Health Service. Using a Weberian framework of 
political action, we explore the impact of intra-organizational and macro-
political dynamics on the initiative, highlighting the role of legitimate power 
and authority on learning within this organization. Through analysis of the 
practical and symbolic implications of the commitment to „become a 
university‟, we identify sources of organizational resistance to the model of 
learning that the initiative promoted. Finally, we trace the traditional and 
rational-legal political processes whereby the initiative was dissolved by 
undermining the charismatic authority on which it was founded. We conclude 
by considering the wider implications of our analysis for understanding 
structures of authority in learning. 
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Introduction 
 
While power and politics are now recognized as an important influence on 
organizational learning (Coopey, 1995; Contu et al., 2003), and the 
importance of subunits in conditioning organizational power relations has 
repeatedly been demonstrated (Salancik and Pfeffer, 1977; Pfeffer, 1992), the 
impact of intra-organizational power dynamics on the subunit that controls, 
designs and delivers training is rarely considered. This paper focuses on a 
well funded, high profile, relatively short-lived organizational training and 
learning initiative, NHS University1 (NHSU), and analyses the politics involved 
in its inception, development and demise.  
 
NHSU formed part of the UK National Health Service (NHS), a public sector 
organization that is structurally and culturally subject to changing political 
agendas. As one of our interviewees suggested, since its launch in 1948 the 
NHS has come to be seen as a secular counterpart to the Anglican Church, a 
talismanic institutional pillar of English identity2. Organizational change is 
therefore highly contested. The NHS employs more than 1.5 million people 
and is thought to be the world‟s largest publicly funded healthcare 
organization (and the fourth largest organization in the world by number of 
employees). Located within a complex web of institutions, power relations, 
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and interest groups, it is also of great interest to organizational researchers 
(see Fulop et al. (2000) or Ashburner (2001) for summaries of recent 
research). Since its inception the NHS has been centrally directed from a 
Department of State answerable to Parliament. It is structured and managed 
through strategic health authorities, which in turn oversee local healthcare 
trusts that are responsible for hospital, general practitioner, dental and other 
forms of care. 
 
However, through being defined as a „corporate university for the NHS‟, the 
NHSU also impacted upon a second, highly controversial institutional context, 
the higher education sector. The initiative drew on the symbolism, 
management and governance practices and structures of „traditional‟ 
universities and employed academics and administrators from the higher 
education sector. In so doing it challenged the position of existing institutions 
within the learning and training market and the very idea of the university, at a 
point when the British government was promoting corporate involvement in 
university funding and activity and suggesting that use of university title might 
be extended.  
 
It is within these two highly politicised contexts that NHSU must be evaluated. 
We suggest that a Weberian framework enables analysis of the case in a way 
which provides insight into the political nature of training and learning more 
broadly. Whilst Weber‟s writings on bureaucracy may be familiar to scholars 
of management learning, less attention has been paid to his theory of 
legitimate authority, developed in response to the changing nature of politics 
in the modern state (Weber, 1978[1925]). We suggest that the case of NHSU 
exemplifies the interplay of traditional professional power, rational-legal 
policymaking and charismatic authority involved in the management of policy-
based learning. These dynamics are particularly important in analysing 
vocational educational and training (VET) initiatives which challenge 
established organizational norms of learning and education. Our analysis 
shows political action to be both constraining and enabling and highlights the 
importance of differing conceptions of legitimate authority in determining the 
success of policy-based organizational learning initiative. 
 
Charismatic, traditional, and legal authority 
 
Until recently analyses of organizational learning paid scant attention to 
issues of hierarchy, politics, and institutionalised power relations (Blackler and 
McDonald, 2000). In an early contribution, Coopey (1995) notes that power 
relations both constrain and enable actors in their ability to structure learning 
debates. He further suggests that analyses should investigate differences of 
interest, shedding light on the process of managing learning by considering its 
social context (Blackler and McDonald, 2000). However, even analyses of 
learning that are sensitive to social context tend to consider only intra-
organizational or inter-professional issues, thus neglecting the pivotal role 
played by policy and institutions of state (Ferdinand, 2004). Ferdinand 
emphasises „the power of UK government policy to create and encourage 
structural relations of interpellation‟ (2004: 449). Thus what is learned, how it 
is learned, and whether learning takes place are not decisions that employees 
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make freely. In addition, the management of VET initiatives such as NHSU is 
significantly affected by systems of authority, including perceptions of valid 
authority and the legitimacy of actors or groups. The links between political 
structure and legitimate political action are also connected to norms of 
acceptable behaviour and action (Spencer, 1970; Contu et al., 2003) which 
are in turn linked to the „sedimented‟ deep structures in the NHS, particularly 
relating to the authority of clinicians and differing occupational structures of 
medical and managerial employees (McNulty & Ferlie, 2004). From a 
Weberian perspective, politics is a system of power underpinned by 
domination, an apparatus of authority and retention of a monopoly on violence 
(Weber, 1978). This perspective enables a focus on the inter-organizational 
as well as the intra-organizational politics of learning and the institutional or 
state level politics that condition them. In addition, it enables a focus on the 
role of the training subunit in these political processes.  
 
The most familiar source of authority is charisma. Although it is now 
commonplace to for this term to be used to refer to any form of leadership that 
is highly personalized or personality based, charisma originally carried more 
specific connotations. Adopted from theology and adapted to reflect secular 
analytical possibilities, charisma refers to a self-legitimating form of 
domination to which followers accede willingly. For Weber (1978), 
organizations founded on charismatic authority are unusual in two respects: 
first, the powers or qualities of the leader cannot be accessible to „ordinary‟ 
people and second, such organizations are initially financed by gifts. The ideal 
type of charismatic authority is exemplified by religious belief systems and led 
by an individual who is considered extraordinary with supernatural or 
superhuman powers and qualities. This perception, along with a unique 
ethical vision and powers of inspiration, generates legitimacy and an ability to 
dominate followers. Charismatic authority claims the right to break through 
existing normative structures (Spencer, 1970). Such legitimate authority is, 
however, fragile and liable to evaporate should conditions change. Hence if a 
crisis passes, a war ends, or a leader‟s closeness to god or ethical perfection 
is challenged, authority is likely to be questioned. As Weber argued, for this 
form of organization to survive authority must become routinized in response 
to „everyday economic conditions‟ (Weber, 1978: 252). As we argue below, 
failure to make this shift was significant for NHSU.  
 
In contrast, legitimate domination within a traditional, principally pre-modern 
political context is founded on custom and inherited power. Patriarchal 
political systems such as monarchies and feudal societies are the ideal type 
of this form of legitimate authority. While the „office‟ of the leader is 
established and respected, legitimacy and therefore power remain tied to 
individual status. Hierarchy, training, and coherent systems of rules are mostly 
absent, although there is more sense of formality. Finally, we find the modern 
legal or rational-legal political systems of authority. Here legitimacy rests on 
perceptions of the legality of enacted rules. There is an expectation that 
power will be exercised according to legal principles rather than personal 
whim and limits to behaviour are encoded in consensual norms. Those 
exercising power are also subject to authority and work within bureaucratic 
structures that eliminate personal prejudice or capriciousness.  
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From this we can construct a framework for political analysis which has a 
number of advantages over previous approaches (see Figure 1). First, it 
allows for analysis at systemic and individual levels and makes clear the link 
between the two. Second, Weber‟s analysis takes national politics to be 
central to understanding power and authority, thereby enabling analysis of this 
important dimension of organizational politics. Third, a Weberian framework 
provides a threefold framework that allows different forms of legitimacy and 
authority to be interpreted and their interplay to be analysed.  
 
 
 
Figure 1: Weberian framework for political analysis 
 
Methods 
 
Data collection was funded by the Economic and Social Research Council‟s 
Centre for Skills, Knowledge and Organisational Performance (SKOPE). 
Analysis is based on two forms of data: documentary data from three sources 
(UK government policy documents, NHSU documents and newspaper reports 
– see Appendix 1) and interviews with 18 senior managers and executives 
who worked in and with NHSU. Each interview lasted between 90 minutes 
and 2 hours and was transcribed verbatim. The interviews were conducted 
after NHSU ceased activity, between 2005 and 2006. This post-hoc data 
collection was enabled by links maintained with organizational members, 
enabled by one of the research team who had worked on secondment to 
NHSU for two years. Our initial request for research access made towards the 
end of the initiative‟s life was unsuccessful. However once NHSU no longer 
formally existed, we were able to negotiate consent to be interviewed directly 
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from individuals who had been involved in the initiative. This process 
illustrates the potential benefits of post-hoc research into initiatives and 
organizations that are no longer operational, since the potential for harm is 
perceived to be less and therefore access more likely to be granted. All 
participants felt there was a „story worth telling‟, as one put it, and that NHSU 
had been „written out‟ of VET policy history. The analysis also serves as a 
useful corrective in the literature concerned with VET. Too often accounts of 
learning are stories of unalloyed success, perhaps because authors are 
anxious to stress its benefits and organisational members are complicit in this, 
therefore permitting access to initiatives that are regarded as successful and 
to people who view them favourably.  
 
In addition, failures are seldom reported because once an organization or 
initiative ceases to exist it becomes more difficult to study. Hence even with 
the advantages of working with an „insider‟ to aid access, we found it difficult 
to trace people and documents. We were also refused a number of interviews 
as some individuals did not want to revisit a complex and frequently painful 
episode. Our respondents included academics, NHS managers, private sector 
managers, full-time union officials, clinical staff, and civil servants. All but 
three are male, reflecting the gender balance of senior staff at NHSU. The 
iterative data collection process involved ongoing analysis of participants‟ 
accounts and documents in relation to theory. Respondents frequently 
engaged in a high degree of analytical reflection on their experiences, using 
their skills and education (many had previous experience of employment in 
senior positions in Higher Education institutions) to retrospectively interpret 
the initiative. 
 
The data was considered by respondents and researchers to be sensitive 
(Lee, 1993), both in relation to the topic (a publicly funded policy initiative that 
had „gone wrong‟ and in the process spent considerable sums of taxpayers‟ 
money) and the people involved (politicians, senior civil servants, academics, 
government advisers, and senior NHS employees). We therefore sought to 
protect respondents‟ anonymity to a relatively high degree3, aggregating 
comments in an effort to limit their potential identification. In the data analysis 
section, we make only limited distinction between respondents through 
differentiating between the comments of „executives‟ (executive and non-
executive board members) and „managers‟ (section heads within NHSU and 
managers within the NHS). This decision reflects the need to balance the 
principle of public accountability, through gaining access to a powerful group 
of business and government elites that did not necessarily want to be studied 
(Galliher, 1982), against the obligation to consider potential harm to 
respondents and their organizations that might result from research (ESRC, 
2005). 
 
Our interpretive approach to understanding policy development and 
implementation meant we were less interested in evaluating the efficacy of 
NHSU and more concerned with the meanings that surrounded it (Yanow, 
2000). „In vivo‟ coding (Strauss and Corbin, 1990) was used to create 
categories based on words or phrases used by participants to tell their story of 
events. This enabled a multi-level analysis of the institutions, groups and 
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individuals involved in the initiative and the values, beliefs and feelings 
associated with it. Through understanding the processes of meaning 
construction that surrounded the initiative we sought to develop a 
conceptualization of organizational learning that took greater account of the 
complexities of power and politics. 
 
Analysis: A clash of ideals 
 
The rise of NHSU 
Since its foundation in 1947 the NHS has been shaped by UK political policy 
(Harrison et al., 1990), most recently through the development of a model of 
corporate rationalization (Scott, 1992) which replaced a former model of 
clinically-orientated consensus management (Harrison and Pollitt, 1994; 
Strong and Robinson, 1998). Recent policy initiatives have been oriented 
towards the development of entrepreneurial subjectivity (du Gay, 2000) 
supported by a discourse of organizational learning (Contu et al., 2003). 
However, McNulty & Ferlie (2004) suggest the ideal of radical 
transformational change in the NHS is likely to give way to convergent change 
as the process and possibilities is shaped by sedimented „deep structures‟ of 
occupational power and authority. They also suggest that the long-standing 
image of clinical-managerial conflict in the NHS may be mistaken, as 
clinicians and managers form coalitions to resist or challenge externally 
imposed organizational change. The professional cadre of managers 
committed to New Public Management (Ferlie et al., 1996) and elite medical 
professions combine to retain the vertical hierarchical structure that supports 
their interests with the result that attempts to introduce more laterally oriented 
governance models are undermined.  
 
Learning within the NHS is largely controlled by independent professional 
associations, universities and trade unions, depending on whether employees 
are pre-registration, post-registration or non-clinical. Training has been 
perceived as having relatively low status within the NHS and the notion of a 
„university for the NHS‟, first mooted in a position paper commissioned by the 
British Association of Medical Managers (BAMM), represented an attempt to 
rectify this. The notion also reflected the private sector fashion for corporate 
universities as a means of developing learning organizations. Senior 
politicians and their advisors turned towards private sector examples, such as 
Disney University and Motorola University (Wiggenhorn, 1990), for guidance. 
The idea was given greater substance in the 2001 Labour Party election 
manifesto which stated „we will set up a university of the NHS‟. As one 
respondent told us, it was a „political mission‟ from its inception generated by 
special advisors and politicians rather than within the NHS. The expression 
and enactment of power was thus an integral part of the initiative. 
 
Following Labour‟s success in the 2001 general election, responsibility for the 
„university for the NHS‟ was passed to the Department of Health Strategy Unit 
for further development. A chief executive (who also took the title „vice-
chancellor designate‟) was appointed, a budget was allocated, and a series of 
consultation exercises took place during 2002 and 2003 (Davies, 2002). In 
December 2003, the initiative, which had by then become NHSU, was 
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constituted as a Special Health Authority to bring it into the NHS. The 2003-4 
chief executive‟s report contained the following introduction: 
 
NHSU was set up in response to the Government‟s commitment to 
establish a university especially dedicated to health and social care, 
which would help transform the quality of healthcare delivered by the 
NHS, and which would guarantee to staff at all levels opportunities for 
training and career development… 2003/04 has been a year of 
development, and of careful preparation for delivery. NHSU is now 
poised to make a major difference to the lives of staff in health and 
social care, and to patients, carers and service users. 
 
Respondents‟ accounts emphasized the excitement that surrounded the 
initiative in its initial stages. There was a generally held view that the initiative 
represented a means of fundamentally changing Europe‟s largest 
organization. This involved creating opportunities for the 40% of NHS 
employees who did not engage in any form of training. Offices were 
established in one of London‟s most prestigious and expensive corporate 
neighbourhoods. As one executive commented, „it began with very high 
expectations and considerable support, particularly political support. The 
aspirations and the rhetoric around the NHSU were breath-taking‟. Another 
noted that people involved in NHSU felt they were part of the project to 
„engage health care workers in decision making and change the pattern of 
authority in the Health Service‟ [manager]. The initiative was thus clearly 
intended to achieve radical organizational change. 
 
The early progress of NHSU was dominated by the construction of its internal 
political structure. The system of power was predominantly charismatic but 
also contained traditional aspects. Many respondents spoke of their 
recruitment to an organization dominated by its appointed leader whose 
authority was legitimated through his vision of training all members of the 
NHS. At the time, respondents said that they had faith in this vision. However, 
retrospectively they also noted that in this period those involved failed to 
establish belief in NHSU‟s legitimacy in any of its institutional contexts: 
professional (both clinical and managerial), educational, organizational and 
state. Consequently, the authority constructed through the charismatic 
political system did not have validity beyond NHSU. Moreover, respondents 
and reports in health service journals indicated that the 
bureaucratic/traditional political structure of the NHS was neither 
acknowledged nor respected within NHSU. 
 
Our main argument as to why and how NHSU did not become embedded 
relates to the failure to establish a valid authority structure to administer 
learning. Respondents noted retrospectively that „Service‟ responses to the 
highly emotionalized form of authority in NHSU were negative from the outset. 
NHS managers and clinicians invoked an alternative political system of 
„tradition and custom‟ to challenge NHSU, and continued to work with a 
framework of obligations underpinned by personal loyalties in commissioning 
learning. This patrimonial administration and „system of favourites‟ strongly 
resisted the interventions in learning proposed by NHSU. Latterly, those 
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involved in NHSU and those resisting it sought to mobilise legal authority, 
particularly in relation to the use of university title. 
 
Respondents also spoke of the „vertiginous experience of charisma‟ (Lee 
2003: 352) that characterized the early period of NHSU. Many executives 
were recruited partly on the basis of their willingness to follow the „vision‟; as 
one respondent explained, „I came because [the first chief executive] was so 
incredibly charismatic, visionary, passionate, articulate and convincing‟. 
Others explained that recruitment depended on being „on song‟ and unlikely to 
question the established vision.  The leader, one respondent noted, believed 
he had been „anointed‟ by the political masters of the NHS. Another described 
NHSU as an „enclave‟, an organization with high levels of emotional 
commitment and personal loyalty led with messianic zeal.  
 
However, NHSU also manifested characteristics associated with a traditional 
authority structure with legitimacy founded on personal loyalty and obedience 
to a single person as well as a charismatic individual. Weber (1978) notes that 
an organization structured by traditional authority will be staffed by „retainers‟ 
or „comrades‟ known to the leader; one respondent noted that many NHSU 
staff were people the first chief executive had „been to war with before‟. This 
patrimonial, gendered recruitment strategy involved construction of legitimate 
authority based on obedience to the person rather than enacted rules (as in a 
rational-legal organization) or a transcendent truth (as in an organization 
founded on charismatic authority). One respondent spoke of a „carefully 
crafted veneer of consultation and democracy‟ that was undermined by non-
consultative action backed up by an expectation of obedience. This form of 
traditionalism „places serious obstacles in the way of formally rational 
regulations‟ and produces wide scope for „arbitrariness and the expression of 
purely personal whims‟ (Weber, 1978: 239). This is seen in two areas: first, 
the refusal to abandon or modify the pursuit of university title, and second, 
administration of terms and conditions of employment.  
 
The desire for a university title was practically and symbolically significant. In 
addition to being crucial to the naming of the initiative, it featured in the 
appointment of senior staff, many of whom came from academia, including 
the chief executive or „vice-chancellor designate‟. Working practices were also 
said to be similar to a university, characterised by long meetings in which 
ideas for papers were explored and „philosophical‟ discussions of the nature 
of the university were pursued, one respondent describing the atmosphere as 
like an „extended tutorial‟. Respondents stated that that NHSU aimed to be 
perceived as equal to „other‟ universities, this attracting hostility from senior 
members of accredited universities. Respondents also noted how this issue 
came to dominate activity and thought. A university title was a „non-
negotiable‟ aspect of the initiative, according to one executive, despite 
emerging doubt about the wisdom of devoting considerable resources to 
achieving it. Latterly, executives began to question the „doctrinaire‟ approach 
to this issue promoted by NHSU‟s chief executive. This called into question 
the legitimacy of the organization‟s authority structure by challenging the 
primary goal of its leader. 
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The nature of authority in NHSU is also evident from accounts of recruitment 
and the financial administration. Many respondents commented on the 
generous terms and conditions of employment, noting especially pay levels 
that were unusually high for the healthcare or education sectors. One 
respondent recollected that the organization was unable to spend the 
allocated budget, an extraordinary situation in her experience of the NHS. In 
addition, budget setting did not happen for the first two years of the initiative‟s 
life. A retrospective record of spending was kept by an administrator. 
However, this individual was unable to engage with the complexities of cost 
accounting due to lack of training. Following the eventual appointment of a 
formally qualified accountant, budget setting proved to be problematic, mainly 
because of the lack of a clear business plan. Negotiating funding levels for 
individual subunits was therefore „subjective‟, according to one executive. 
Another said that funding levels were set on the basis of „who threatened to 
resign or burst into tears‟. Both procurement and internal employment 
contracts were, again according to respondents, allocated on an unsystematic 
basis and of doubtful legal validity  
 
In addition to questioning the title of the initiative, some were unclear as to its 
core aims and what they were employed to do. One manager argued that this 
lack of clarity led to NHSU becoming a „receptacle for hip projects with 
politicians‟. Perhaps the most significant moment came when the then 
Secretary of State for Health and political sponsor of NHSU left his ministerial 
post. This crystallised the difficulties faced by those involved with the initiative. 
 
There‟d been this big announcement, „they‟re going to have a 
university for the NHS‟ and policy advisors had not actually sat 
ministers down and said this doesn‟t fly. It was very much a personal 
mission of [the Secretary of State for Health], so once he went the 
commitment to it went as well. 
Executive 5 
 
During the beginning of 2004 we suddenly got presented with this 
demand from the Department of Health, which was „we want this to be 
a university by May‟... I‟d actually happened to see him [the new 
minister for health] on the train and I talked him through what is 
involved in becoming a university. What became very, very evident at 
that point was that civil servants within the department were not being 
really clear with ministers about what the issues were. And nobody had 
actually sat him down and told him how you become a university… I 
think ministers quite liked the idea of having their own university and 
when they found out that this was actually a hellishly more complicated 
thing than they had envisaged, then I think there was some more 
residual cooling off… If there is one thing that finally hit the whole idea 
of a university on the head was when the Department of Health were 
told that a university is an autonomous body. Because as soon as they 
were told that there was absolutely no chance that they were ever 
going to put money into an autonomous body. 
Executive 2 
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NHSU, like many other corporate universities (Craig et al., 1999), was derided 
in newspapers and journals for its academic aspirations (see Appendix 1). 
One respondent noted that NHSU could have been a great success „except 
that the NHS isn‟t a corporation and NHSU was never a university‟. The ideal 
of independence underpinned much of the political conflict and struggle for 
authority over issues such as learning programme content. Consequently, 
NHSU came to be perceived by outsiders as „dangerous‟, guided by 
leadership based on charisma and lacking rational-legal validity.  
 
The dangers of NHSU 
Organizational learning is often perceived as a dangerous activity that needs 
to be controlled (Vince, 2001). This is particularly evident when it involves 
ideas of meritocracy or radical change which may be resisted by other parts of 
the organisation. However, training subunits often have relatively little 
influence or authority relative to other parts of the organization and are thus 
more endangered than dangerous. These dynamics characterise the next 
phase of NHSU. Those associated with the initiative became increasingly 
involved in challenging existing power relations within the NHS (and the 
Department of Health) in order to raise the status of training and learning: 
 
What the NHS needed from the NHSU was an institution that wasn‟t 
simply a tool of the Department of Health, [but] the Department of 
Health was never going to give the kind of autonomy to NHSU that it 
needed to be able to do the job that it was created to do… there is no 
tradition at all in the NHS of that apart from the Royal Colleges, who 
are a terrible inconvenience, but they were here before we had the 
NHS so we [don‟t know how] to stop them, though we keep trying 
[laughs]   
Manager 5 
 
NHSU came to be seen as dangerous in a number of respects. First, it 
challenged the exclusive use of university title by established educational 
bodies thereby confronting the traditional and rational-legal authority of 
established universities. Second, NHSU challenged established cultural 
norms within the NHS and the Department of Health through its geographical 
location, rates of pay and recruitment of staff from outside „the Service‟. 
Respondents noted the challenge this presented to the „top team‟ within the 
NHS, an elite group of mainly white men with a common background in the 
NHS graduate training programme or certain medical schools who knew each 
other well and were very protective of „their organization‟. NHSU was thus 
seen as challenging the validity of a traditional system of political domination4. 
Third, NHSU became „dangerous‟ when journalists and academics began to 
question where the „product‟ was. Staff developed a high profile at 
conferences and meetings but maintained a low profile in the provision of 
training programmes. The initiative thus became exposed to challenge based 
on rational-legal political assessment of its activities.  
 
Finally, NHSU came to be seen as dangerous within its host government 
department which held the power to dissolve the initiative. NHSU was initially 
funded for three years, to a sum of around £30 million; this later increased to 
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approximately £53 million. At first, the initiative had been welcomed. However, 
curriculum developments were extremely slow in the first two years and 
funding thus began to be questioned: 
 
There was an incredibly difficult stage when… the one penny increase 
on National Insurance kicked in and we came under unbelievable 
pressure from the Department [of Health], which I guess was also 
under pressure from No. 10, to come up with good news stories, show 
where the money was going, what were we doing and so on. This was 
where the lack of anything in the larder became a real problem. 
Executive 3 
 
At this point those at senior levels admitted to doubts as to whether NHSU 
would survive. Respondents spoke of the „wheels coming off‟ and a 
heightened awareness of the organization‟s essentially charismatic political 
nature. Hostility towards NHSU generated within the UK media also grew, 
articles criticising the initiative‟s use of a university title and the level of 
funding it received in comparison to the training materials produced. In its first 
two years the NHSU‟s principal output was a general induction programme, 
raising concerns about „value for money‟. Optimism and ambition thus turned 
to fear and pragmatism. 
 
NHSU’s demise 
The 2003-04 annual NHSU report claimed a central role in the reframing of 
the NHS as a learning organization.  At the same time, the UK government 
set up a review of „Arms Length Bodies‟ (ALBs), stand-alone national 
organizations that undertake executive functions for and are accountable to 
their majority funder, the Department of Health. The stated aim of the review 
was to reduce costs, improve efficiency, and cut bureaucracy. Initially NHSU 
was excluded from this review. However, the decision was subsequently 
taken to include it through a specially commissioned report. NHSU employees 
believed from the outset that the „Wells Report‟, led by Sir William Wells, 
would be hostile to the initiative. As one respondent noted, „when Wells is 
appointed to review anything you might as well measure it up for the coffin‟. 
By summer 2004 staff talked openly about when funding would be withdrawn. 
In November the Secretary of State for Health published his plans for 
„reconfiguring‟ the 38 ALBs to 20. The Modernisation Agency, NHS 
Leadership Centre and NHSU were to „merge‟ to form a new Institute for 
Learning, Skills and Innovation (which subsequently became the NHS 
Institute for Innovation and Improvement, based at the University of Warwick). 
On July 31st 2005 NHSU was formally dissolved. In the space of four years 
the initiative had moved from an idea inspired by private sector practice, to a 
political manifesto promise, to a UK-wide initiative employing around 300 
people, to closure.  
 
Respondents described the atmosphere of secrecy that surrounded 
publication of the Wells Report. Access to the report was tightly controlled, 
respondents informed us, with less than 10 authorised copies in circulation 
overall (although respondents also told stories of unofficial copies hidden in 
filing cabinets). Even after the closure of NHSU the Department of Health 
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refused to release the report into the public domain, despite requests under 
the Freedom of Information act brought by journalists and academics5. While 
only a handful of respondents said they had read the report, those who had 
expressed strong opinions: 
 
It was inaccurate. It was biased. It was the sort of consultancy report 
that if it had been sent to me by a junior consultant… I would have sent 
back and told them to do it again. There wasn‟t any methodology - if 
you had seen that piece of work come to you from a BA student you 
would have… I went back to [a senior civil servant] and, in writing, told 
him that if this was issued as a published document… I would probably 
sue for defamation because the statements made… were such that my 
reputation would be ruined, frankly, and that I would have no choice but 
to sue and I would expect to be joined in that action by [other 
executives]. 
Executive 1 
 
That so-called review… which isn't worth the paper you'd wipe your 
arse on, quote, attributable [laughs]. I thought it was an abuse of an 
inquiry. [He] had already reached the conclusion before he started his 
inquiry… he told me at the first meeting, the very kick off of his so-
called review. He found a way of expressing an antipathy that other 
people already felt. 
Executive 2 
 
Once the Wells Report had been published, it was clear that the death of the 
initiative was inevitable. The state had exercised rational-legal authority 
through a process of review. As numerous respondents argued: 
 
I think the decision came primarily from within the Department [of 
Health]… we weren‟t part of the structure there, we weren‟t walking 
round the corridors, we weren‟t friendly with the key people there and… 
it would mean that we were very much sort of to one side and out of 
control anyway… 
Executive 1 
 
The context is critical. You can look at the internal machinations and 
decide this is a funny organisation. I certainly did, but I don‟t think you 
can say that‟s why it failed. It is the bigger scene you have to look at. 
Manager 5 
 
The outcome of these political dynamics was also experienced at an 
individual level. Reinforcing the politicised nature of the initiative and the 
organizations it interacted with, many respondents spoke of difficulties in 
being reassigned either within „the Service‟ or other Arm‟s Length Bodies. We 
could find only two people who transferred to the new Institute from NHSU. A 
stigma was attached to having been employed by NHSU; association with it 
was seen as a „mark of Cain‟, or something people were „tarred‟ with. 
 
Conclusion 
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The NHS has been going through so many changes… that it would 
have needed a really powerful organisation to inculcate a corporate 
system of education and training… You would have needed not only 
the supportive people. You would have needed more political 
diplomatic skills than we had available to us to do it. It was a hugely 
ambitious project. 
Manager 7 
 
Initially NHSU was set out as an attempt to promote organizational learning. 
Many of those involved in the initiative were highly skilled, politically astute, 
well informed and worked very hard to make the initiative successful. They 
were well able to comprehend the scale of the task and harboured few 
illusions about the difficulties involved. Yet the initiative failed. As the 
preceding analysis suggests, this was because NHSU was inherently political, 
its fate embedded in structures of institutional power and authority.  
 
Our analysis also suggests that attempts to promote organizational learning 
were unsuccessful because the initiative challenged too many establishments 
or deep structures of political power in the NHS simultaneously. NHSU was a 
victim of changing policy priorities and financial constraints, a rational-legal 
explanation. Politics at the level of the organization, shaped by politics at the 
state level, were thus central to its failure, as the following quote indicates. 
 
A political initiative needs consistent political support to bring it to 
fruition… if you don‟t have that consistent political support to see it 
through, the actual performance may be… beside the point. That's 
particularly true in a terrain like learning… who [is] looking at this and 
saying, does this pose some kind of a threat or a challenge to us? In a 
world which is already sharply over-populated [with initiatives] and in 
some senses contested, for such an intervention to have any chance, it 
needs… that political support. 
Manager 2 
 
Interactions between competing forms of political power and authority create 
the social and political context of organization and learning. In order to fulfil its 
stated aim of enabling its host to become a learning organization, those 
involved in NHSU sought to mediate competing professional groupings, 
macro and micro-politics and lead the NHS towards an ideal of learning 
through the construction of political authority. It has been argued that ideal 
learning happens when „the “establishment” that is being created through the 
very process of organizing can be identified and critically reflected upon‟ 
(Vince, 2001: 1326). This was what many of our respondents were told they 
had been employed to do, by constructing a university for the NHS that would 
allow NHS staff, civil servants and even patients to critically reflect on the 
organization. It became clear, however, that this vision of learning was not 
shared by those with administrative and legal authority. The initiative 
challenged the „dominant ideology‟ (Ferdinand, 2004: 441) characteristic of 
traditional and charismatic structures of authority, that limits learning by 
circumscribing the „right kind of knowledge‟ that individuals and organizations 
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should acquire (cf. Contu et al., 2003). These authority structures, which 
Ferdinand (2004) suggests are typical of UK government interventions into 
organizational learning and skill development, lead to a lack of clearly defined 
spheres of competence and the absence of appropriate technical training, the 
very things that NHSU sought unsuccessfully to address. Ultimately the 
dominant, normative form of authority, rational-legal, proved most significant, 
and NHSU‟s brief life as a radical training subunit for the NHS ended. 
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Appendix 1: Policy documents and newspaper reports 
 
Relevant policy documents 
DH (2000) The NHS Plan: A plan for investment, a plan for reform. London: 
Department of Health Command Paper CM 4818-I.  
DH (2004) Reconfiguring the Department of Health’s Arm’s Length Bodies. 
London: Department of Health paper 40378.  
Labour Party (2001) 2001 Labour Party General Election Manifesto: 
Ambitions for Britain. London: The Labour Party. 
Department for Education and Skills (2003) The Future of Higher Education. 
Norwich: The Stationery Office ltd. 
NHSU (2004) Improvement Through Learning: First Annual Report 2003-
2004. London: NHSU. 
 
Reports on NHSU in The Guardian 
Carvel, J. (2002) „A tricky operation‟, December 17th. 
McLeod, D. (2004) „This is an emergency‟, November 23rd. 
McLeod, D. (2004) „NHS university axed‟, November 30th. 
Carvel, J. (2004) „Quango cull will save health service £500m a year‟, 
December 1st. 
Tuckett, A. (2005) „Lame academy‟, March 22nd.  
McLeod, D. (2005) „NHS „university‟ takes final breath‟, July 29th. 
 
Web-based material 
e-health insider (2007) http://www.e-health-
insider.com/news/item.cfm?ID=2597, accessed 05/04/07.  
http://www.rodspace.co.uk/blog/blogger.html, accessed 05/04/07. 
 
 
 
                                                 
1
 The initiative began life as „University for the NHS‟, then appeared as a „University of the 
NHS‟, changed into the „NHS University‟, and finally became „NHSU‟, mainly as a result of 
controversy relating to the use of university title (although one interviewee told us the „U‟ also 
came to signify „Unfunded or Unclear, then eventually Unwanted and Unloved‟. For the sake 
of economy we refer to the initiative throughout as NHSU. 
2
 The NHS is present in all the constituent parts of the United Kingdom, but takes a slightly 
different form in Wales, Northern Ireland, and Scotland. Although NHSU was set up as a UK-
wide initiative, our data and analysis refer primarily to the English experience and NHS 
structure.  
3
 A measure of the sensitivity surrounding NHSU can also be read into the Department of 
Health‟s refusal to release the report which led to its closure (the „Wells Report‟), despite 
requests under the Freedom of Information act by journalists and academics. The report was 
finally made public in 2007 after a ruling from the Information Commissioner in favour of 
release; the Department of Health appealed but then withdrew hours before the appeal 
hearing and released the report. 
4
 There is of course an evident irony in the objections we heard on the subject of how „clubby‟ 
the NHS top team were, when we remember that NHSU was itself a „closed‟ organization in 
terms of its recruitment and selection: the majority of our respondents were recruited to the 
initiative through personal acquaintance with the chief executive or another senior member; 
the gender balance was skewed towards the masculine; all of our respondents were white; 
and most were recruited on the basis that they signed up to a very particular ideological vision 
of the NHS and training/learning.  
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5
 The report was finally made public in 2007 after a ruling from the Information Commissioner 
in favour of release, following a series of applications made by Rod Ward (Faculty of Health & 
Social Care, University of the West of England). The Department of Health appealed the initial 
ruling but withdrew hours before the appeal hearing and released the report.  
